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Abstract
We study the short-run effects of shocks to government spending on Ireland’s output
and its real exchange rate. We show that the impact of government spending shocks crit-
ically depend on the nature of the ﬁscal innovation. Our main ﬁnding is that there are
important differences between shocks to public investment and shocks to government con-
sumption. Moreover, within the latter category, shocks to the wage and non-wage compo-
nents also have dissimilar effects.
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11 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to estimate the short-run impact of government spending on the Irish
economy. More speciﬁcally, we are interested in whether the impact depends on the type of
government spending. Along these lines, we investigate whether public investment operates
differently to government consumption. In relation to the latter category, we also explore the
potential differences between non-wage government consumption (purchases of consumption
goods and services from the private sector) and wage government consumption (whereby pub-
lic services are produced by publicly-employed workers).
There has been a renewal of interest in estimating the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy. In part,
this relates to the development of VAR estimation techniques that were initially applied to the
estimation of the effectiveness of monetary policy. From a policy perspective, ﬁscal policy is es-
pecially important for individual member countries of the euro area, since it is the only national
stabilisation instrument in the event of a country-speciﬁc macroeconomic shock. Most recently,
the pushing of interest rates towards zero and the blocking of the traditional credit channel of
monetary policy means that ﬁscal policy has taken centre stage in tackling the current global
recession.
We consider the impact of ﬁscal shocks on two key macroeconomic variables: the level
of output and the real exchange rate. The former is included, since we wish to estimate the
“ﬁscal multiplier” (the change in aggregate output that is associated with a given change in
government spending). The latter is included since the real exchange rate is a key variable for
an open economy. For instance, a policymaker may wish to deploy ﬁscal policy to engineer a
real depreciation if she wishes to improve the trade balance and/or re-orientate the economy
towards the export sector.
Theoretically, thedynamiceffectsofgovernmentspendingshocksdifferbetweenapproaches.
Neoclassicalmodelspredictthatspendingshocksincreaseoutputandproducenegativewealth
effects that lead to an increase in the labour supply, a decrease in real wages and private con-
sumption, and no change or depreciation of the real exchange rate. In contrast, New Keynesian
models with nominal rigidities produce different responses. Government spending shocks in-
crease labour demand, real wages, private consumption and output. Moreover, the real ex-
change rate appreciates. While the estimates that we obtain may help to shed light on the
relative merits of alternative modelling approaches, our motivation in this paper is primarily
empirical.
Our empirical method is to employ a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, with
ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed by assuming a recursive ordering.1 Under this approach, it is assumed
1This approach is shared by Beetsma et al (2006, 2008), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Monacelli and Perotti (2006),
Ravn et al (2007). The main alternatives are to identify ﬁscal shocks using a ’narrative’ approach or by imposing
sign restrictions on the impulse-response functions. Examples of the former include Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
while examples of the latter include Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
2that shocks to output and the real exchange rate do not affect ﬁscal policy contemporaneously,
whereas a ﬁscal shock is allowed to have an immediate impact effect on these two variables.
Accordingly, this ordering allows us to identify the impact of exogenous shifts in government
spending on the level of output and the real exchange rate.
While Roberto Perotti and his various collaborators have argued the recursive approach is
most appropriately applied to quarterly data, this has limited empirical analysis to four coun-
tries that have satisfactory quarterly data sets (United States, United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia). Accordingly, it is necessary to employ annual data if we wish to study the impact
of ﬁscal shocks on Ireland. In any event, B´ en´ etrix and Lane (2009) show that the results for the
“Perotti” group of countries are very similar whether quarterly or annual data are employed.
Moreover, annual data have some conceptual advantages over quarterly data. For instance,
Beetsma et al (2006) argues that it is less likely that annual measures are as vulnerable to antic-
ipation effects as is the case for quarterly data.
InadditiontothemainVARmodel, wealsoexplorethechannelsbywhichﬁscalshocksmay
affect the real exchange rate. In particular, we estimate ancillary models in order to estimate
the impact of ﬁscal shocks on the relative price of nontradables and the level of real wages.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical
method, while Section 3 presents the results for the baseline model and some robustness tests.
We study the impact of ﬁscal shocks on the relative price of nontradables in Section 4 and on
real wages in Section 5. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Method
2.1 Data
The literature dealing with ﬁscal shocks has considered a range of different measures of gov-
ernment spending.2 Most papers have focused on government consumption, whether in the
aggregate (Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Monacelli and Perotti 2006) or subcomponents (Mona-
celli and Perotti 2008 focus on non-wage government consumption, while Cavallo 2005, 2007
studies wage government consumption and Giordano et al 2007 compare the effects of wage
and non-wage government consumption). Beetsma et al (2006, 2008) provide an important ex-
ception, by analysing total government absorption and also the individual public investment
and public subcomponents.
We adopt a general approach and consider ﬁve measures of government spending: to-
tal government absorption (the sum of total government consumption and government ﬁxed
2Government spending has three components: government consumption, government investment and transfers
(welfare payments, pensions). Since transfers just redistribute spending across private citizens, it should not have
a ﬁrst-order short run impact on macroeconomic variables and we exclude that component from the analysis that
follows.
3investment); government ﬁxed investment; government consumption; wage government con-
sumption; and non-wage government consumption. The time span of our data is 1970 to 2006
and the frequency is annual. The data are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook database
(version No. 82).
The second variable used in our baseline model is gross domestic product in constant local
currency units. The source of this variable is also the OECD Economic Outlook. The last vari-
able in our baseline estimations is the CPI-based real effective exchange rate vis-` a-vis the rest
of the EMU, published by the European Commission.
2.2 Database in relative terms
Since we are interested in evaluating how ﬁscal policy affects the real exchange rate, we mea-
sure the ﬁscal variables and the level of output in relative terms, as deviations from a weighted
average of the values for other countries. In particular, we are especially interested in under-
standing real exchange rate movements vis-` a-vis other members of the euro area, such that we
construct a set of indices which measure the deviations of our variables of interest from the
rest-of-EMU countries. The general index formula is
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The subindex j stands for other EMU countries. !j is the time-invariant trade weight of







EXPj;t are nominal exports from Ireland to country j and IMPj;t are Ireland’s nominal im-
ports from country j, in period t.4 Both are measured in current U.S. dollars. EXPt represents
3Since these trade weights are very stable in the 1970 to 2006 period, there is no signiﬁcant change in the results
by considering either !j;t or !j.
4The source of these data is the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of the International Monetary Fund.
4total exports to the EMU while IMPt stands for total imports from the EMU. We set t0=1971
and T=2006.
We use trade weights instead of GDP weights because trade spillovers from discretionary
ﬁscal policy are found to be important in EU countries (Beetsma et al. 2006). Moreover, trade
weights are more consistent with the third variable of our model; the real effective exchange
rate.5
Figure 1 shows the index in equation (1) for the types of government spending as well as
for the GDP deviations from other EMU member countries. Moreover, it presents the evolution
of the real effective exchange rate vis-` a-vis the same countries. All variables are measured in
log levels.
The ﬁrst panel shows that the real exchange rate has shown trend real appreciation. How-
ever, the evolution of this variable really consists of two phases: the ﬁrst between 1971 and
1987 and the second between 1988 and 2006. Ireland experienced real depreciation between
1971 and 1976 and from 1982 to 1996. As regards the GDP differential, Ireland has experienced
and important acceleration at the beginning of the 1990s that sustains until 2006. For the case
of government spending differentials this ﬁgure shows that all types had two peaks: the ﬁrst in
the late 1970s/early 1980s and the second in 2001. By contrast, these variables show substantial
declines between 1988 and 1994.
2.3 Shock identiﬁcation
As highlighted in Beetsma (2008), the literature has followed two strategies to identify exoge-
nous ﬁscal shocks. The ﬁrst one is to take events for which it is reasonable to assume that they
are exogenous and unexpected. This is the ‘narrative’ or ‘Dummy Variable’ approach (Ramey
and Shapiro 1998; Edelberg et al. 1999; Burnside et al. 2004 and Romer and Romer 2007).
The second strategy is to identify shocks imposing structural restrictions. Identiﬁcation
strategieswithinthissetvarywiththefrequencyofthedata. Moststudiesusingnon-interpolated
quarterly data identify ﬁscal shocks using the procedure developed by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Perotti (2004). This method decouples the cyclical and the discretionary component
of ﬁscal policy assuming that systematic discretionary responses of ﬁscal variables are absent
in quarterly data. To do this, they make use of country-by-country elasticities available from
the OECD (2005) of the various components of net taxes with respect to output.
Ireland has non-interpolated quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 onwards. Since
a longer span of quarterly data is not available, we are constrained to use annual frequency
and a different identiﬁcation strategy. However, the use of annual data has some advantages,
5Trade weights used in the real effective exchange rate published by the European Commission are not exactly
the same as those used to construct the rest-of-EMU variables. The former retrospectively includes Slovenia as
an EMU country, while we exclude Slovenia from the output and ﬁscal measures, since its inclusion would be
problematic in terms of data availability prior to the mid 1990s.
5as highlighted by Beetsma et al. (2008). First, shocks are closer to what may be properly in-
terpreted as a real ﬁscal shock, since ﬁscal policy is typically not substantially revised within a
year. Second, the use of annual data reduces the role of anticipation effects.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) test for the existence of anticipated ﬁscal policy with future
values of estimated ﬁscal shocks using quarterly frequency. To this end, they include future
values of a dummy variable that measures ﬁscal shocks in their empirical model. They show
that anticipation effects are not important in the United States.
Studies suggesting the existence of anticipation effects ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy may be antici-
pated one or two quarters in advance. Using a new variable based on narrative evidence that
improves the Ramey-Shapiro military dates, Ramey (2008) shows the existence of anticipation
effects that produce qualitative changes in the responses of consumption and real wages. To
show this, she performs different Granger causality tests between the war dates and the VAR
shocks. The latter were deﬁned as the residual of a dynamic empirical model in which up to
four lags of the dependent variable are included.
In our dataset, the presence of anticipation effects could be tested by checking whether
output differentials or the real exchange rate Granger causes future values of the government
spending VAR shocks. Another strategy would be the implementation of tests similar to those
used by Ramey (2008). However, this is not possible in our dataset because series of govern-
ment spending shocks identiﬁed with the narrative approach are only available for the United
States.
Since we use annual frequency any anticipation of policy changes that are further than two
quarters into the future becomes less likely. Finally, the use of annual data makes seasonal
effects to be less important than in quarterly data. The reason for this is that seasonal changes
in ﬁscal variables are less likely to have cycles that last more than one year.
In terms of identiﬁcation strategies with annual data, the available options, besides the
structural approach based on short- or long-run restrictions or a combination of these two, are:
sign restrictions or Choleski decomposition. In the ﬁrst case, the identiﬁcation is pursued by
constraining the cross-correlation function in response to shocks to assign structural interpre-
tation to orthogonal innovations. This method, as in Canova and Denicol´ o (2002) and Uhlig
(2005), is used by Mountford and Uhlig (2005) and Canova and Pappa (2007) to identify ﬁscal
shocks.
As in Beetsma et al. (2006, 2008), we use the Choleski decomposition. The reason for this
choice is that using sign constraints in the context of our model would imply to impose a sign
for a certain number of periods to the correlation between government spending deviations
and the real growth differential, leaving the response of the real effective exchange rate uncon-
strained. Here, rather than relying on this data-driven approach to identify spending shocks,
we assume that some variables are not allowed to react contemporaneously to shocks in others.
Although we identify shocks in a similar fashion, our baseline speciﬁcation differentiates
6from Beetsma et al. (2008) in four main aspects. First, all variables are deﬁned as deviations
from the rest-of-EMU countries. Second, we specify a narrower VAR consisting of a measure
of government spending, gross domestic product and real exchange rate. Third, we study the
effect on the exchange rate of government expenditure (total government consumption plus
investment), these two components separately, wage government consumption and non-wage
government consumption. Finally, we study a single country, rather than a panel.
Our three-variables structural model in companion form can be written as follows
A0Zt = A(L)Zt 1 + CXt + "t: (5)
Zt is a vector of endogenous variables containing: the government spending differential
from the rest-of-EMU countries (gt), the real GDP differential (yt) and the real effective ex-
change rate (et). Xt is a vector with the intercept (c) and linear trend (tt). Matrix A0 captures the
contemporaneousrelationsbetweentheendogenousvariables. MatrixA(L), isthematrixpoly-
nomial in the lag operator L that captures the relation between the endogenous variables and
their lags. Matrix C contains the coefﬁcients of the country ﬁxed effects, the country-speciﬁc
linear trends and the time ﬁxed effects. The vector "t, contains the orthogonal structural shocks








































Premultiplying (5) by A 1
0 we obtain our model in reduced-form,
Zt = B(L)Zt 1 + DXt + ut; (6)
where B(L) = A 1
0 A(L), D = A 1
0 C, ut = A 1









and var(ut) = :
In order to recover "i;t and 
 from the reduced-form, we impose yg = eg = ey = 0 to
matrix A0:
Imposing these restrictions is equivalent to assume that ﬁscal spending deviation from the
rest of the EMU countries does not react contemporaneously to shocks in the real GDP differ-
entials or the real exchange rate and; that the real GDP differential does not react contempora-
neously to shocks in real exchange rate. Therefore, the Choleski ordering to identify shocks is:
government spending deviations, GDP differential and real effective exchange rate.
These identiﬁcation assumptions are in line with papers dealing with the effects of discre-
tionary ﬁscal shocks in the sense that we order g before y. This ordering is motivated by the fact
that government spending is planned before the period starts. Moreover, Beetsma et al. (2006)
estimate a panel VAR in public spending (g) and output (y) for seven EU countries with non-
7interpolated quarterly ﬁscal data assuming that g does not react to y within a quarter. From
these results they construct an estimate of the response of public spending to output at annual
frequency ﬁnding that it is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
3 Baseline Model
3.1 Main Results
This section presents the responses of Ireland’s output and real exchange rate to shocks in
different types of government spending. To this end, we estimate a series of models, one for
each type of government spending variable. Since we use annual data, we set the lag length of
each endogenous variable to two. Moreover, the Durbin Watson statistic shows that with this
lag length, ﬁrst order autocorrelation is absent. We also include a linear trend.
Inourbaselinespeciﬁcation, weconsidertheimpactofshocksto“real”ﬁscalvariables-that
is, we deﬂate the ﬁscal variables with the relevant ﬁscal deﬂators.6 For informational purposes,
Tables 1 to 5 present the reduced-form estimates of each system.
Figure 2 shows the responses of all endogenous variables to a ﬁscal shock of one percent of
GDP.7 Government absorption (GEXP) is deﬁned as the sum of government consumption and
government ﬁxed investment. Recall that all government spending measures as well as the
GDP are deﬁned as deviations from the rest of the EMU countries. Therefore, GEXP measures
the deviation of the Irish government absorption from the trade-weighted average level of
government absorption in other EMU member countries.
Apositiveshocktothisgovernmentspendingvariablegeneratesapositiveimpactresponse
in the output differential, which subsequently turns negative between three and four years
after the realization of the shock. By contrast, the response of the real exchange rate is positive
along the whole impulse-response horizon. It appreciates 0.9 percent on impact and continues
appreciating in the subsequent three years. The peak is equivalent to a 2.6 percent appreciation
in the third year.
Once we turn to subcomponents of total government absorption, we see some marked con-
trasts across different items. In particular, a shock to government investment has a positive
ﬁscal multiplier, whereas innovations in government consumption do not increase the level
of output. In relation to the real exchange rate, a public investment shock generates a peak
real appreciation of 6 percent in the third year, whereas a shock to government consumption
6For government consumption excluding wages, we use the deﬂator of total government consumption. We
consider alternative approaches in Section 3.2.
7Over the sample period, the average levels of each component of government absorption (expressed as a ra-
tio to GDP) were 20.0, 3.3, 16.7, 10.1 and 6.6 percent for government absorption, investment, consumption, wage
consumption and non-wage consumption respectively. Accordingly, a 1 percent of GDP shift would represent a rel-
atively small shock in terms of total government absorption but a relatively large shock if it were fully concentrated
in public investment.
8generates a more persistent real appreciation (even if the peak value if lower).
Taking a closer look at government consumption, we see that the subcomponents of gov-
ernment consumption produce different responses. A positive shock to wage government
consumption (WGC) has a negative ﬁscal multiplier, generating a negative output differen-
tial while also producing substantial real appreciation (peaking at 6.6 percent in the fourth
year). By contrast, shocks to non-wage government consumption (NWGC) have a positive
ﬁscal multiplier, with no effect on the real exchange rate.
Our discussion so far has focused on the point estimates of the impulse-response functions.
Figure 2 also shows plus/minus one standard deviation bands, in line with the approach of
most of the ﬁscal VAR literature.8 Given the relatively limited degrees of freedom, it is not too




In order to check the robustness of the baseline results, we follow two strategies. The ﬁrst one
is to check whether the measured ﬁscal shocks in the baseline model might be distorted by
not controlling for other components of government spending. This is relevant in examining
the impact of subcomponents of aggregate government absorption, since a shock to public
investment may be correlated with shocks to non-investment spending, which would not be
picked up in the three-variable system. Accordingly, we consider an expanded four-variable
system, in which the ‘complement’ of the ﬁscal variable in question is also included. The ‘ﬁscal
complement’ variable is deﬁned as the difference between total government absorption and
the spending variable being considered. That is, if we take government investment, the fourth
variable of the system would be government absorption minus government investment.
The advantage of including this fourth variable is that it minimizes potential biases in the
reduced form coefﬁcients due to the omission of other types of government spending that are
correlated with the spending variable being studied. We adopt the conservative approach of
assuming that the ﬁscal variable of interest is ordered after the complement ﬁscal variable.
(However, we have also run the system with the opposite ordering of the ﬁscal variables and
the impulse response functions are similar across the two speciﬁcations.)
Figure 3 shows the responses of the four endogenous variables to shocks in government
investment, consumption, wage government consumption and non-wage government con-
sumption. Consistent with the baseline model, Figure 3 shows that a shock in government
investment produces real appreciation. This real exchange rate response has a maximum of 5.2
8The standard deviations of the estimates are generated through 1000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulated,
as encoded in RATS 7.0.
9percent in the third year. Moreover, the output response is positive along the whole impulse-
response horizon and is more persistent than in the baseline model.
A shock to total government consumption has a negative ﬁscal multiplier in terms of its
impact on output and produces real depreciation in the four-variable system, rather than real
appreciation. The largest depreciation is one year after the realization of the shock and it is
equivalent to a 5.4 percent depreciation.
In line with the baseline speciﬁcation, innovations in wage government consumption gen-
erate a negative output differential and produce real appreciation in latter years. Moreover,
this shock gives the largest real appreciation across all government spending types. This is
equivalent to 6.8 percent in the fourth year.
Finally, ashocktonon-wagegovernmentconsumptioncomponenthasapositiveﬁscalmul-
tiplier. In terms of the real exchange rate, this shock generates real depreciation on impact and
in the subsequent four years. By contrast, the exchange rate response in the baseline speciﬁca-
tion was close to zero.
3.2.2 Debt Feedback
Following Beetsma et al. (2008), we further test the results of the baseline speciﬁcation by
including the general government consolidated gross debt as a ratio of GDP from the Annual
Macroeconomics Database of the European Commission (AMECO). More precisely, we include
thelogarithmoftheﬁrsttwolagsofthisvariableineachequationofthemodel. Thisisincluded
since government spending may systematically respond to the level of public debt (higher debt
placing downward pressure on spending levels). Figure 4 shows that the introduction of the
government debt as a ratio of GDP does not generate qualitative changes in the responses.
Moreover, the response of output is larger in this speciﬁcation than in the baseline model in the
case of a shock to public investment.
3.2.3 Summary
Overall, theserobustnesschecksshowthatsomeresponsesarequantitativelysensitivetochanges
in the empirical speciﬁcation but that the general pattern of results is relatively stable in terms
of the ranking of the different types of government spending.
The exchange rate responses that survive all tests are those produced by shocks in gov-
ernment investment or wage government consumption. These generate real appreciation in-
dependently of the empirical speciﬁcation. By contrast, the robustness check based on the
four-variable system shows that the real exchange rate appreciation produced by a shock in
government consumption in the baseline speciﬁcation turns to real depreciations. Moreover,
the zero exchange rate response to shocks in non-wage government consumption turns also to
real depreciation in the four-variable system.
103.3 Alternative Fiscal Measures
Up to now, we have deﬂated government spending data using each speciﬁc government price
deﬂator. This is the strategy followed by Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006) and Beetsma et al. (2006,
2008), among others. Under this approach, the ﬁscal shock refers only to a shock to the volume
of government spending.
In this subsection, we allow ﬁscal shocks to also take the form of shocks to the relative price
of government spending. We do this deﬂating ﬁscal variables with the GDP deﬂator, such
that the ﬁscal variables will shift in line with either a change in relative prices or a change in
quantities.9 This follows the strategy of Lane and Perotti (2003), Pappa (2005), Perotti (2004,
2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2006).
Figure 5 shows the real exchange rate responses to these shocks in the ﬁve types of govern-
ment spending.
As in the baseline model, a shock to total government absorption has an initially positive
impact on output that subsequently turns negative. However, it generates a larger and more
persistent exchange rate appreciation than in the baseline model.
The impact on output and the real exchange rate is similar to the baseline model in the
cases of shocks to government investment, government consumption and wage government
consumption. Bycontrast, ashockinthenon-wagegovernmentconsumptionproducesalarger
real depreciation in the ﬁrst two years relative to the baseline model. Moreover, the output
response is more persistent than in the baseline.
Moreover, Figure 6 presents the responses in the four-variable system. The inclusion of the
complement government spending variable eliminates the real exchange rate appreciation that
is produced by a shock to government consumption. As in the baseline model, the real depre-
ciation generated by a shock to the non-wage government consumption component becomes
larger when the fourth variable is included.
4 Relative price of nontradables
Since the relative price of nontradables plays an important role in real exchange rate ﬂuctua-
tions (especially for members of a currency union), we study its responses to positive govern-
ment spending shocks. To this end, we re-run the baseline model but replace the real effective
exchange rate with the ratio of nontradable to tradable price indices, expressed in relative terms
vis-` a-vis trading partners.
As in the baseline model, the relative price of nontradables evolves following equation (1).
That is, it follows the difference between the rates of change in relative price of nontradables
in Ireland and the rate of change in the EMU benchmark. The latter is formed by the trade
9For parsimony, this imposes that the effects of relative price shocks and quantity shocks are the same.

































Similarly to equation (2) j stands for the other EMU countries and !j is a time invariant
trade weight given by equation (4). PNT and PT are prices of nontradable and tradable goods,
respectively. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), we take a weighted average of three
different price indices (‘construction’, ‘hotels and restaurants’ and ‘community social and per-
sonal services’) to represent PNT, while the ‘manufacturing’ price index represents PT. The
source for these sectoral price indices is the EU KLEMS database.
Figure 7 shows the responses to spending shocks equivalent to 1 percent of GDP in each
government spending type. The response of the relative price of nontradables is qualitatively
the same as the response of the real exchange rate in the baseline model. For the cases of gov-
ernment absorption, government investment and wage government consumption, the impact
of ﬁscal shocks on the relative price of nontradables positive, albeit with a lag. In contrast,
shocks to non-wage government consumption generates a relative decline in the relative price
of nontradables. When we augment this system by introducing the complement government
spending variable in Figure 8, the main difference is that the relative price of nontradables now
responds negatively to a shock to aggregate government consumption.
5 Real wage channel
The labour market is a central channel by which ﬁscal policy affects the structure of relative
prices. Accordingly, this section extends our analysis by studying the effect of positive govern-
ment spending shocks on real wages.
To this end, we take annual data in log levels for the period 1970 to 2006. As in Perotti
and Lane (2003), we deﬁne real wages as CPI-deﬂated real compensation per employee. The
source of these data is the AMECO database. The setup of the empirical model is similar to
the one described in Section 2. For this section, it is not necessary to express variables in terms
of deviations from trading-partner average values, since we wish to establish the impact of a
shock to domestic government spending on the domestic level of real wages.
Figure 9 presents the responses of real wages to shocks equivalent in magnitude to 1 per-
cent of GDP in each type of government spending variable, while Figure10 shows the wage
responses in the four-variable empirical speciﬁcation.
AninspectionofFigure9showsthatashocktototalgovernmentabsorptionhasanegligible
impact on real wages. This masks a striking contrast between shocks to public investment and
12government consumption. A positive shock to public investment is associated with a decline
in real wages, whereas a positive shock to government consumption tends to raise real wages.
Moreover, this holds true for both wage government consumption and non-wage government
consumption.
When we turn to the four-variable empirical speciﬁcations in Figure 10, the differences be-
tween shocks to public investment and government consumption are ampliﬁed. Shocks to gov-
ernment investment produce larger and more persistent negative real wage responses, while
shocks to government consumption and its two subcomponents produce larger positive real
wage responses.
6 Conclusions
The main message from the empirical analysis in this paper is that the impact of government
spending shocks on the level of output and the real exchange rate critically depend on the
nature of the ﬁscal innovation. In particular, there are important differences between shocks
to public investment and shocks to government consumption. Moreover, it is also important to
distinguish between wage and non-wage components of government consumption.
These results come with important caveats. First, the model is estimated over the 1970-
2006 period, such that the ﬁscal multipliers are average effects across the range of economic
conditions faced by Ireland over that interval. In particular, the size of the ﬁscal multiplier
surely varies with the level of slack in the labour market and the perceived sustainability of the
ﬁscal position.
This paper has focused on the short-run impact of ﬁscal shocks. However, Galstyan and
Lane (2008a, 2008b) show that the composition of government spending also matters for the
long-run behaviour of the real exchange rate, with public investment associated with real de-
preciation and government consumption associated with real appreciation. Accordingly, in
evaluating the short- and long-run impact of ﬁscal adjustment programmes on the level of out-
put and the level of external competitiveness, it is essential to take into account the composition
of shifts in government spending.
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14Table 1: VAR estimates for GEXP.
GEXP GDP REER
GEXPt 1 1.023 -.038 .1103
[.1615]*** [.1198] [.1813]
GEXPt 2 -.417 -.070 .0660
[.1360]*** [.1009] [.1527]
GDPt 1 .1501 .7806 .0144
[.2557] [.1897]*** [.2870]
GDPt 2 .3648 .3672 -.128
[.2847] [.2112]* [.3196]
REERt 1 .1630 -.043 1.092
[.1454] [.1079] [.1632]***
REERt 2 -.269 -.136 -.382
[.1430]* [.1061] [.1605]**
Trend -.008 .0001 .0041
[.0023]*** [.0017] [.0026]
Cons. .2362 .7031 .9188
[.3347] [.2483]*** [.3756]**
DW 1.840 2.036 2.387
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
15Table 2: VAR estimates for GINV.
GINV GDP REER
GINVt 1 1.117 .0207 .0771
[.1526]*** [.0360] [.0511]
GINVt 2 -.538 -.030 -.003
[.1494]*** [.0352] [.0500]
GDPt 1 .0936 .7983 -.114
[.8157] [.1926]*** [.2732]
GDPt 2 .8204 .2510 .0387
[.8724] [.2060] [.2922]
REERt 1 1.017 -.071 1.057
[.4864]** [.1148] [.1629]***
REERt 2 -1.05 -.103 -.394
[.4615]** [.1089] [.1546]**
Trend -.015 .0017 .0040
[.0065]** [.0015] [.0022]*
Cons. -1.54 .6172 1.445
[1.360] [.3211]* [.4556]***
DW 1.903 1.931 2.304
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
16Table 3: VAR estimates for GC.
GC GDP REER
GCt 1 .7380 -.211 -.106
[.1842]*** [.1744] [.2776]
GCt 2 -.124 .0039 .2665
[.1489] [.1410] [.2244]
GDPt 1 .2381 .7710 .1316
[.1912] [.1810]*** [.2882]
GDPt 2 .2209 .4562 -.160
[.2166] [.2051]** [.3265]
REERt 1 .0431 -.032 1.107
[.1069] [.1013] [.1612]***
REERt 2 -.183 -.180 -.385
[.1082] [.1024]* [.1631]**
Trend -.007 -.000 .0021
[.0017]*** [.0016] [.0026]
Cons. .5858 .9838 .6135
[.2725]** [.2580]*** [.4107]
DW 2.120 2.140 2.342
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
17Table 4: VAR estimates for WGC.
WGC GDP REER
WGCt 1 1.119 -.238 .1904
[.1707]*** [.1866] [.2877]
WGCt 2 -.250 .0764 .0573
[.1791] [.1958] [.3019]
GDPt 1 -.119 .7158 .1716
[.1668] [.1823]*** [.2810]
GDPt 2 .3256 .3927 -.174
[.1761]* [.1924]* [.2967]
REERt 1 .0590 .0158 .9938
[.0994] [.1087] [.1676]***
REERt 2 -.179 -.177 -.339
[.0917]* [.1002]* [.1545]**
Trend -.003 .0002 .0029
[.0011]*** [.0012] [.0019]
Cons. .3621 1.046 .3615
[.2525] [.2760]*** [.4255]
DW 2.214 2.143 2.381
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
18Table 5: VAR estimates for NWGC.
NWGC GDP REER
NWGCt 1 .4448 .0129 -.310
[.1728]** [.1126] [.1570]*
NWGCt 2 -.315 -.120 .3254
[.1246]** [.0812] [.1132]***
GDPt 1 .8349 .8103 .1581
[.2921]*** [.1904]*** [.2654]
GDPt 2 .7050 .3955 -.067
[.3523]* [.2296]* [.3201]
REERt 1 -.327 -.093 1.149
[.1628]* [.1061] [.1479]***
REERt 2 -.232 -.143 -.447
[.1699] [.1107] [.1544]***
Trend -.036 -.002 .0007
[.0063]*** [.0041] [.0057]
Cons. .7160 .7655 .8736
[.3871]* [.2523]*** [.3517]**
DW 1.966 2.081 2.140
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
19Table 6: 4-variable system: estimates for GINV.
GINV GEXP-GINV GDP REER
GINVt 1 1.198 0.141 0.073 0.137
[.1943]*** [.0301]*** [.0370]* [.0611]**
GINVt 2 -0.626 -0.162 0.009 -0.082
[.2070]*** [.0321]*** [.0394] [.0651]
GEXP   GINVt 1 -0.737 0.320 -0.464 -0.543
[1.040] [.1616]* [.1983]** [.3273]
GEXP   GINVt 2 0.665 0.313 0.048 0.543
[.8557] [.1328]** [.1630] [.2691]*
GDPt 1 0.259 0.238 0.661 0.042
[.8969] [.1392] [.1708]*** [.2820]
GDPt 2 0.828 0.286 0.603 -0.005
[1.024] [.1591]* [.1952]*** [.3222]
REERt 1 1.019 0.045 -0.090 1.061
[.5001]* [.0776] [.0952] [.1572]***
REERt 2 -1.080 -0.157 -0.218 -0.401
[.5001]** [.0776]* [.0952]** [.1572]**
Trend -0.019 -0.009 -0.001 0.002
[.008]** [0.001]*** [.0015] [.0026]
Cons. -1.716 0.233 1.853 1.127
[2.292] [.3558] [.4366]*** [.7207]
DW 2.066 1.686 2.510 2.315
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
20Table 7: 4-variable system: estimates for GC.
GC GEXP-GC GDP REER
GCt 1 0.320 -0.737 -0.464 -0.543
[.1616]* [1.040] [.1983]** [.3273]
GCt 2 0.313 0.665 0.048 0.543
[.1328]** [.8557] [.1630] [.2691]*
GEXP   GCt 1 0.141 1.198 0.073 0.137
[.0301]*** [.1943]*** [.0370]* [.0611]**
GEXP   GCt 2 -0.162 -0.626 0.009 -0.082
[.0321]*** [.2070]*** [.0394] [.0651]
GDPt 1 0.238 0.259 0.661 0.042
[.1392] [.8969] [.1708]*** [.2820]
GDPt 2 0.286 0.828 0.603 -0.005
[.1591]* [1.024] [.1952]*** [.3222]
REERt 1 0.045 1.019 -0.090 1.061
[.0776] [.5001]* [.0952] [.1572]***
REERt 2 -0.157 -1.080 -0.218 -0.401
[.0776]* [.5001]** [.0952]** [.1572]**
Trend -0.009 -0.019 -0.001 0.002
[.0012]*** [.0083]** [.0015] [.0026]
Cons. 0.233 -1.716 1.853 1.127
[.3558] [2.2918] [.4366]*** [.7207]
DW 1.686 2.066 2.510 2.315
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
21Table 8: 4-variable system: estimates for WGC.
WGC GEXP-WGC GDP REER
WGCt 1 1.067 -0.405 -0.299 0.252
[.1795]*** [.9618] [.2079] [.3209]
WGCt 2 -0.166 0.369 0.100 0.052
[.1808] [.9688] [.2094] [.3232]
GEXP   WGCt 1 0.063 0.964 -0.004 0.026
[.0322]* [.1726]*** [.0373] [.0575]
GEXP   WGCt 2 -0.036 -0.494 0.026 -0.044
[.0311] [.1666]*** [.0360] [.0556]
GDPt 1 -0.165 0.925 0.710 0.165
[.1632] [.8744] [.1890]*** [.2917]
GDPt 2 0.314 0.261 0.373 -0.152
[.1717]* [.9198] [.1988]* [.3069]
REERt 1 0.026 0.178 0.042 0.950
[.1011] [.5414] [.1170] [.1806]***
REERt 2 -0.162 -0.580 -0.186 -0.322
[.0895]* [.4797] [.1037]* [.1600]*
Trend -0.003 -0.013 0.000 0.003
[.0012]** [.0065]* [.0014] [.0022]
Cons. 0.398 -0.555 1.156 0.231
[.2708] [1.451] [.3136]*** [.4840]
DW 2.16 1.842 2.193 2.361
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
22Table 9: 4-variable system: estimates for NWGC.
NWGC GEXP-NWGC GDP REER
NWGCt 1 0.201 0.002 0.050 -0.537
[.1732] [.1973] [.1321] [.1568]***
NWGCt 2 -0.380 0.265 -0.080 0.248
[.1694]** [.1930] [.1292] [.1534]
GEXP   NWGCt 1 0.488 1.096 -0.063 0.448
[.1568]*** [.1785]*** [.1195] [.1419]***
GEXP   NWGCt 2 -0.270 -0.587 0.006 -0.231
[.1444]* [.1645]*** [.1101] [.1308]*
GDPt 1 0.858 -0.058 0.781 0.195
[.2794]*** [.3182] [.2130]*** [.2530]
GDPt 2 0.965 0.111 0.349 0.179
[.3262]*** [.3715] [.2487] [.2954]
REERt 1 -0.505 0.471 -0.049 0.974
[.1776]*** [.2023]** [.1354] [.1608]***
REERt 2 -0.268 -0.307 -0.130 -0.484
[.1541]* [.1755]* [.1175] [.1395]***
Trend -0.047 0.006 0.000 0.009
[.0085]*** [.0097] [.0065] [.0077]
Cons. 1.119 -0.120 0.681 1.261
[.3900]*** [.4441] [.2973]** [.3532]***
DW 2.006 1.872 2.023 2.066
Note: EMU sample. *, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Standard deviation in square brackets. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic.
23Figure 1: Real exchange rate, GDP and government spending.












































Government ﬁxed investment Total government consumption


















Wage government consumption Non-wage government consumption
Note: Real exchange rate is real effective exchange rate vis-` a-vis other EMU members. GDP and gov-
ernment spending are deviations from the rest of EMU countries. All variables are in log scale.













































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real effective exchange rate
vis-` a-vis other EMU countries (e).
25Figure 3: Four-variable system. Responses to 1% of GDP government spending shock. Shocked












































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real effective exchange rate
vis-` a-vis other EMU countries (e).
26Figure 4: Responses to 1% of GDP government spending shock (VAR model includes two lags









































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real effective exchange rate



















































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending deﬂated using GDP deﬂator (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated
real effective exchange rate vis-` a-vis other EMU countries (e). 28Figure 6: Four-variable system. Responses to 1% of GDP government spending shock. GDP-





















































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real effective exchange rate
vis-` a-vis other EMU countries (e).




















































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and relative price of nontradables (e).
30Figure 8: Four-variable system. Response of relative price of nontradables to 1% of GDP gov-












































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and relative price of nontradables (e).































































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real wages (w).
32Figure 10: Four-variable system for real wage model. Responses to 1% of GDP government




















































































































































shock in WGC shock in NWGC
Note: Solid lines are the point estimates of the Impulse-Response mean. Dotted lines are the 16th and
84th percentiles from Monte Carlo simulations based on 1000 replications. Vertical axis indicates the
percentage change in government spending (g), GDP (y) and CPI-deﬂated real wages (w).
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